Law as a product of policy process is obviously a result of political bargaining between competing interests (Tuori, 2002; Stefanou, 2008; Ordonez et al., 2021), including in the enactment of the Omnibus Bill as the Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 11 Year 2020 concerning Job Creation (hereinafter Omnibus Law). The bill was initiated by the President of Indonesia following the governments™ commitment to stimulate investment that, in turn, creates job opportunities for the workforce. The government believes that loads and overlapping regulations are the main factors inhibiting investment. By introducing the Omnibus Bill, the government tried to amalgamate numbers of legislation, simultaneously repealing and replacing norms. The Omnibus Law consists of 11 clusters with more than 1,000 provisions legislating the workforce, investment, land law, ease of doing business, industry, and national economic strategic plan. Although it repealed provisions in 79 acts, the omnibus as a legislative technique was controversial; it was completely new for the Indonesian legislative system that previously acknowledged ˜one theme one act™.
Political Capture in the Omnibus Law-making Process and Implementing its Regulations
Indonesia has been an important source of global coal demand since 2005 (Lucarellli, 2015), and maintained this position up to 2013 (Cornot-Gandolphe, 2017), and 2017 (Friederich and van Leeuwen, 2017). In 2018, Indonesia was the world™s 5th largest coal producer; it is also the 2nd top coal exporting country. The total amount of coal production in 2018 was 548.6 million tonnes; of this, 114.55 million tonnes were utilised for domestic consumption (British-Petroleum, 2019). Coal has been the major source of energy (Baskoro et al., 2021); currently the coal-fired power plant capacity in Indonesia may reach 31 Gigawatts (GW) (Shearer et al., 2020). With this huge use of coal in the energy sector, it is estimated that these coal-fired power plants will produce 8.31 million tonnes of fly ash in 2019 with a 5% per year increase (Petrus et al., 2020). The coal and mining industry is related to Indonesian politicians and government officials (WALHI, 2020b). There are at least eight MPs, seven top ranking officials and two Indonesian business elites related to the coal industry in Indonesia that are involved in the initiation of the Omnibus Law-making process (Indonesia Corruption Watch, 2020; WALHI, 2020b). This fact indicates that the issuance of FABA regulations might be influenced by the personal interest of politicians and policy-makers. This situation is also known as the ˜political capture™ (TransparencyInternational, 2014), where a group of policy-makers and regulators uses its power for the benefit of a minor constituency and shifts away the policy from the public interest towards special interest (Carpenter and Moss, 2013; Omotoye, 2019).
Purpose
This research analyses the political capture that exists in the Indonesian law-making process. It aims to show possible links between the involvement of businesses in the coal and mining sectors and politicians™ personal interests that may outweigh the goal of protecting human health and environment.
Methodology
The analysis departs from a conceptual and normative approach on the law-making process in Indonesia, then juxtaposes it with facts and provisions around the enactment of hazardous waste regulation
Conclusion
The policy process of the Omnibus Law, followed by the issuance of GR 22/2021, shows the possible influence of politicians who have a close relationship to the coal mining sector. Despite the potential harm that FABA and slag may cause to human health and the environment, the government remains confident that FABA and slag are non-hazardous materials. This argument relies on scientific measures that have not yet settled and effectively implemented in Indonesia. In fact, environmental problems are left unanticipated and even remedy for victims remains unresolved while obligations to the corporation are clearly reduced, whereby coal industry-related politicians benefit from the profit difference before and after the changing criteria of hazardous waste. It is difficult not to conclude that there is policy capture in the exclusion of FABA and slag from the toxic waste list. Further research on the competing interest between the politicians and the public in natural resource industry is needed. This is particularly important to explain how politicians™ and policy-makers™ personal interests should be declared when involved in a policy-making process that may affect public interest.
Penulis: Iman Prihandono
Informasi detail dari riset ini dapat dilihat pada tulisan kami di:
Iman Prihandono, Ekawestri Prajwalita Widiati (2023). Political Capture in the Exclusion of FABA and Slag from Hazardous Waste List Regulation in Indonesia, Vol. 19, No. 1/2, pp. 15“2; DOI:
